The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Trump administration’s tariff scheme, holding that it was unconstitutional in a 6-3 decision. While there were differences of opinion within the majority about the relevance of the major questions doctrine, the message from justices Roberts, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson was clear: Executive branch actions are reviewable by courts, and the president does not possess unlimited powers. The decision appears to have shattered Trump emotionally, and the president had what most observed as a temper tantrum before the TV cameras, even going so far as to accuse the justices of being under the influence of foreign interests.
Last November, Cold Eye Earth reported on the oral arguments presented to the court, and that’s when we all learned, based on two hours of questioning, that the plaintiffs could probably count on at least six justices to ultimately find against the administration as the three liberals on the court were likely to be joined by Gorsuch, Barrett, and Roberts who would ultimately write the opinion for the majority. The Cold Eye Earth summation at the time works well as a re-cap of the case, now decided:
When President Trump imposed across-the-board tariffs on the entire world this past April, he arrogated powers to himself and the executive branch that no president before him has attempted to claim. Justice Barrett pressed the solicitor general fairly hard on the fact that the powers enumerated in the IEEPA legislation not only do not include the word tariff, but “the actual verbs” cited in IEEPA—investigate, block, nullify, void, prevent, prohibit, regulate, direct, and compel—have not been used elsewhere by Congress as stand-ins or substitute concepts for tariffs. Chief Justice Roberts appeared quite resolute in his questioning, saying several times that tariffs are indeed taxes—a theme also sounded out by Justice Sotomayor. Gorsuch, meanwhile, appeared to be rather agitated by the top-down implications of the case, as he repeatedly laid out a scenario whereby either Congress and/or the Supreme Court hands too much power to the president. The country would discover over time, in his view, that such power, once granted can never be clawed back. By the time the plaintiff’s lawyer, Neal Katyal, rose to make their case, it was already clear the government was facing a steep climb: IEEPA does not grant tariff powers in the text, and even if it did, granting revenue-raising powers to the president is something Congress simply can’t be allowed to do.
The standout event of the majority’s opinion surely has to be the very lengthy, 46-page concurrence by Gorsuch, in which he takes to task three of his colleagues on the left and three more on the right. Each set of three, in his view, has long been playing hide-and-seek with the major questions doctrine, and he suggested pretty clearly that the three conservatives (Kavanaugh, Alito, and Thomas) were denying executive powers to Democratic presidents, and expanding them on behalf of Republican presidents while suggesting the three liberals (Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson) were doing the same in reverse, favoring power expansion to Democratic presidents and leaning against Republican presidents (as they did in this case). The man has a point! For Gorsuch, the major questions doctrine and the related non-delegation principle were central to this case. After chastising the conservatives who dissented from the 6-3 opinion for pretending these questions were not applicable, he then pointed to the liberals who had concluded that “the statutory language of IEEPA” was sufficient to deny the president its use as a global tariff vehicle. For Gorsuch, they too were avoiding the major questions doctrine.
Gorsuch’s view may very well have ramifications as Trump attempts to stitch his tariff regime back together using other legal facilities (supposedly) available to him. By foregrounding the robust theme that the executive must generally go through Congress to either enact or sustain tariff actions, he is transmitting to the federal judiciary (in part) a guiding principle they may use as future cases come before them.
Suggested Reading:
Quick Thoughts on the Tariff Decision and the President’s Angry Reaction, by Jack Goldsmith
A breakdown of the court’s tariff decision, by Adam Feldman
Supreme Court, on a 6-3 vote, blocks Trump’s IEEPA tariffs, by Chris Geidner
Unsurprisingly, the Trump team returned to the tariff well the very same day, announcing their backup plan to achieve tariff continuity. Let’s pause here and recall the old proverb “As a dog returns to its vomit, so a fool returns to his folly.” The court’s decision opened an escape hatch for Trump—whose public approval craters to new lows each week—to actually step down from this failed scheme. But, as the saying goes, you’ll never guess what happened next: Trump erected, again by executive fiat, a new slate of global tariffs at a 10% rate, then adjusted that rate upward to 15% in a subsequent social media post. If tariffs were alcohol, we might say the president’s on a bender.
The challenge for Trump now is that the remaining legal pathways to tariffs are much harder. This is an evolving story, so we’ll know more as the weeks go on, but here is a first recap:
• While not a particularly insightful observation, it was clear to Cold Eye Earth and many others that the Trump team chose the IEEPA route first for a reason: All the other options are more limited, more complicated. This point was also made by Harvard’s Jack Goldsmith in his piece linked previously. Had IEEPA granted tariff powers to the president in broad form, or if the major questions/non-delegation issue had not arisen, IEEPA would have worked. But that route is now dead. Now it gets harder—a lot harder.
• Trump has now invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act at the 15% rate globally, which may allow him to keep such tariffs in place for up to 150 days, at which point he would need Congress to ratify them. This tactic is already potentially doomed, however. Section 122 is clearly articulated as a provision to address balance of payment problems. Now, balance of payment problems are not the same as trade deficit problems; and balance of payments problems occurred only in the old days of fixed exchange rates, not floating rates. Indeed, the lawyer who argued the IEEPA case before the court and who is now credited with the victory, Neal Katyal, took to X to make this same point, along with a very juicy additional point: Executive branch lawyers when arguing the IEEPA case before the Supreme Court specifically cited Section 122 as being neither relevant nor applicable to the president’s intent.
• The 6-3 decision delivered Friday is likely to poison the well for further attempts by the administration to apply, reconstitute, or achieve tariffs more generally unless the statutes themselves specifically articulate a rationale. Remember, Trump lost this case because the actual text of IEEPA literally granted no tariff authority among all the powers it gave away. But even if IEEPA had granted those tariff powers, justices like Gorsuch take the view that Congress cannot be allowed to give its powers away to the executive branch. That places Section 122 on extremely shaky ground: Its text doesn’t support the broad tariff power, and even if it did, the major questions/delegation problems arise almost immediately.
• You will have surely noticed by now that the Republican-controlled Congress has done nothing to stop the president’s tariffs, and has so far avoided any vote on the tariffs (with the exception of the singular vote on Canadian tariffs). If Section 122 finds a way to go forward now, and actually endures 150 days, then Congress would be called upon to vote on those tariffs and rest assured that is not something they want to do, especially three to four months before the midterm elections.
• There’s a cynical view that Trump can just play the long timelines of the court system to both have his tariffs now and maintain them until they get shot down again by the Supreme Court. This view is probably wrong. Now that the 6-3 decision is part of the jurisprudence foundation, federal courts not only are likely to be far friendlier to plaintiffs but are likely to issue stays. The U.S. Court of International Trade, for example, and other federal courts are quite likely to take cues from the now decided case, and when it becomes apparent that Section 122 really can’t be invoked in this way, plaintiffs are likely to be granted immediate relief.
• The problem of refunds is going to play out regardless, and we must remember an incredible fact: The Trump administration argued previously in courts that refunds would be no problem if the tariffs were shot down. So now the administration, which already has sparked the ire of the federal judiciary in hundreds of immigration cases, would be on even shakier ground when next appearing in court to rebut the claims of new plaintiffs. Prediction: Invocation of Section 122 will trigger lawsuits almost immediately, perhaps as early as this week, and the administration’s lawyers will have very little support on which to stand. Let’s try another prediction: Section 122 tariffs will be halted by the federal judiciary, and the Supreme Court will not reverse those stays of the tariffs when the government appeals.
Further reading:
Why Trump’s Section 122 Tariffs Are Illegal, by Andrew McCarthy
Trump Loses His Tariff Power, (YouTube video from Paul Krugman)
Making Sense of the Tariffs Ruling, by Steve Vladek
It’s been said that authoritarian regimes are always on the brink of collapse and care little for public opinion. That’s all fine and good if one can avoid elections, but Trump is pressing onward in his tariff quest at a time when his political party is deep in the hole, as the Republicans themselves now become tainted with the administration’s many failures and excesses. A key measure of just how badly the GOP has injured itself will be this fall’s elections, specifically in the Senate. The House of Representatives, for all intents and purposes is already gone: The GOP barely has a majority at the moment, just 3-5 seats, and that will prove completely unsurvivable, given what’s coming in the November elections. This means Trump will absolutely be impeached in the House about one year from now. The laundry list of corruption and illegal actions is already quite lengthy. That list will no doubt be longer by early 2027.
But impeachment in the House has no real teeth unless the president can be convicted in the Senate. President Trump has survived not one but two trials in the Senate, and if Democrats somehow take back the Senate, a conviction becomes feasible, quickly. How is the Senate looking? Well, in just the two weeks since the last letter, betting markets on which party will control the Senate next year have seen Democrats chances rise from 36.5% to 41%, a fairly rapid pace of deterioration in GOP prospects. Moreover, the best election experts would have told you just a year ago that Democrats’ prospects of winning back the Senate were nil. Why is this now changing?
It’s changing because Trump is now losing his base, and is underwater in a number of red states that he won in 2024. What Cold Eye Earth calls the Hard Five—red states with big Senate races that were once totally out of reach for Democrats—are now loosening. Alaska, Ohio, and Texas are not toss-ups yet, but they are nearly there as polling in those Senate races has been rapidly tightening. The other two states, Iowa and Nebraska, are still harder gets for Democrats—but it should be noted that the Democratic candidate for the governor of Iowa has pretty much evened up that race. This is a signal of Iowa’s potential.
If they’re to re-take the Senate, Democrats must win all the races they expect to win—from Georgia to Maine, from North Carolina to Michigan—and then press onward to win at least two of those Senate races in the Hard Five. Because public opinion has swung so hard against Trump, a couple of those races—like Maine and Georgia—were not the layups they are now. And again, it’s fairly incredible to watch this collapse of political support, knowing that the Trump team sees it too and refuses to do anything about it. Unless you believe that Trump will significantly interfere with the election’s outcome this November, it is hard to escape the conclusion that he is is a death machine on course to destroy his own party.
America now must contend with the enormous mess left in the wake of the illegal IEEPA tariffs, and will have to face up to refunds, along with new complications from fresh efforts to apply or litigate new tariffs. Accordingly, it’s way too early to assess how all this will affect the industrial economy, and the corporate earnings of U.S.-based companies both small and large who have always been at least partly reliant on the importation of inputs to their manufacturing output.
But it’s encouraging to discover that after a couple hundred years of free trade experimentation, mostly free trade, rather than mostly restricted trade, appears to be the default position of the world. Cold Eye Earth has long been skeptical of the deglobalization thesis. Let’s be more direct: It’s mostly just bullshit, seeking a paying audience. Trade is a feature, not a bug, of human life, and trade is part of our story as humans, going back thousands of years.
The silver lining in all this is that 21st-century populations have just been given a crash course isn trade theory, and once again Ricardo wins. Put another way, we probably just passed through a peak in trade stupidity, and those of you with market experience understand that intensity can be maintained for so only long, before the pendulum swings away once more. Therefore, it can reasonably be said that it's all likely to get less bad from here.
—Gregor Macdonald






